

Beyond Rokeach's Equality-Freedom Model: Two-Dimensional Values in a One-Dimensional World

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This article supports a two-value model of political ideology, similar to that proposed by Rokeach (1973), through the validation of two value orientation scales, international harmony and equality and national strength and order. Drawing on data from five samples, these value orientations are shown to be independent, robust, and predictably related to other value constructs, social attitudes, voting behavior, and political activism. The two-dimensional model is reconciled with the ubiquitous left-right attitudinal continuum through differentiating between the psychological world of ideas and the political world of action. Political institutions have traditionally imposed a trade-off mentality on decision-making behavior, and the left-right dichotomy is a useful heuristic for making trade-offs when other options are not apparent. This paper argues that individuals adopt a framework that is different from that imposed by political institutions. Their framework allows both security conscious and protective values to be held alongside humanitarian and sharing values, and their liberalism-conservatism can be predicted by the degree to which one value orientation outweighs the other. The middle ground on liberalism-conservatism, therefore, is not the sole domain of the politically naive or disinterested: It is also the domain of those with balanced yet strong social value commitments who may experience lack of engagement with left-right political discourse.

Rokeach's (1968, 1973) seminal work on values was distinctive in its bid to integrate several domains that previously had been kept apart, namely personal goals, foreign policy goals, preferable standards of behavior, and morals. Using Lovejoy's (1950) distinction between adjectival and terminal values as a conceptual platform and the Value Survey as an empirical base, Rokeach was successful

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in bridging the gap between the desirable goals that people strive for and their ideal modes of conduct for everyday life. Less successfully integrated into the value system, however, were social values—that is, abstract beliefs about the goals toward which we, as a society, should be striving. Twenty years on, this paper reviews the strengths and weaknesses of Rokeach's treatment of social values, and presents a program of research that gives social values a more secure footing within the research traditions of human values, social attitudes, and political behavior. Data are presented that show that the social value domain is best represented by two dimensions, *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. Following the theoretical formulations of Kerlinger (1967, 1984) and Rokeach (1973), an argument is presented for the distinctiveness of these value orientations in two important respects. First, research findings demonstrate that support for one of these value orientations does not lessen the likelihood of support for the other. Both types of values can be and often are held simultaneously in the general population. Second, the value orientations, *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*, are shown to have distinctive relationships with personal values, and to make independent contributions to explaining social attitudes, political activism, and political behavior. The role of the two value orientations in determining attitudes and behavior is explained through the value balance hypothesis: that social attitudes and political behavior need to be understood in terms of the relative dominance of one value orientation over the other rather than in terms of the absolute strength of either value orientation.

Rokeach's Two-Dimensional Social Value Model

Rokeach (1973) differentiated two kinds of terminal values; they could be "self-centered or society-centered, intrapersonal or interpersonal in focus" (p. 8). The former he called personal values, the latter social values. Rokeach included five social values in the Value Survey: national security, a world at peace, equality, a world of beauty, and freedom. He argued that the personal values were in competition with the social values, that people would vary reliably in the priority they gave to personal values over social values, and that an increase in one social value would lead to an increase in other social values and decreases in personal values.

Of central importance among the social values were freedom (independence, free choice) and equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all). Rokeach used these values to define two orthogonal factors that he claimed were fundamental to political ideologies across time and cultures. In so doing, Rokeach was not denying the complexity of political ideologies. Indeed, he specifically differentiated values as "beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct or desirable end-states of existence" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 7) from ideology

defined as "an organization of beliefs and attitudes—religious, political or philosophical in nature—that is more or less institutionalized or shared with others" (Rokeach, 1968, pp. 123–124). Thus, while values can be part of an ideology, ideologies comprise a wider variety of beliefs and belief structures that differ in their organizational complexity.

The purpose of the two-value model, therefore, was not to deny cognitive complexity in ideologies, but rather to challenge the dominant paradigm for typing ideologies, the left–right continuum. Rokeach argued that the entrenched left–right conceptualization was an inadequate basis for drawing distinctions and making comparisons among ideologies (Rokeach, 1973, pp. 165–168) and that the minimum number of dimensions needed to develop a typology of ideologies was two. He proceeded to embark on a research program to demonstrate that freedom and equality were the core value components that could be used to compare and contrast all ideologies. Rokeach's central thesis was that the political orientations of socialism, capitalism, fascism, and communism could be mapped onto the four types of value orientations that emerged when the equality and freedom dimensions were considered conjointly. Typifying ideologies that valued both freedom and equality highly was socialism. In contrast, neither freedom nor equality was expected to be valued highly within fascist ideologies. Valuing one relatively more highly than the other was central to the ideologies of capitalism and communism, with capitalists valuing freedom at the expense of equality, and communists valuing equality at the expense of freedom. Rokeach (1973) and his co-workers found support for the model through a values content analysis of the writings of advocates of different political persuasions.

Beyond the political writings of ideologues, however, support for the two-value model was not forthcoming. A number of studies compared value rankings of supporters and candidates of known political parties (Bishop, Barclay, & Rokeach, 1972; Jones, 1982; Rokeach, 1973; Cochrane, Billig, & Hogg, 1979) and the value rankings of students who had identified themselves politically as liberals, moderates, or conservatives (Linder & Bauer, 1979; Rokeach, 1973). Consistently, the value "equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)" discriminated people of different political persuasions. The value "freedom (independence, free choice)", however, did not prove to be a useful discriminator. In five of the six studies just cited, freedom was ranked similarly, albeit highly, by different political groups. In the Linder and Bauer study, the difference was in the opposite direction to that expected. Freedom, like equality, was ranked more highly by liberals than by conservatives.

Rokeach (1979) was not overly concerned by the failure of freedom to differentiate political groups and political leaders in the United States. He argued that one would expect equality rather than freedom to be the differentiating variable, since everyone would be expected to value freedom in a democracy. Other findings reduce the plausibility of this defense. While freedom has been

assigned a high rank in studies in democratic countries, it is often second in importance to a world at peace (Beech & Schoeppe, 1974; Mayton, 1987; Rokeach, 1973, 1974). Yet a world at peace has not lost discriminatory power because of its widespread popularity (Mayton, 1987). In Britain, Cochrane et al. (1979) challenged Rokeach's explanation in a study in which supporters of the Communist, National Front, Labour and Conservative political parties were recruited to complete the Value Survey. While rankings of equality, a world at peace, national security, and a world of beauty differed between the groups, freedom did not.

Three social values in the Value Survey—a world at peace, national security and a world of beauty—have been used successfully to predict support for different political parties, political leaders, and social policies (Cochrane et al., 1979; Feather, 1975; Rawls, Harrison, Rawls, Hayes, & Johnson, 1973; Rokeach, 1973; Sidanius, 1990). The pattern has been for left-wing party supporters and leaders to value a world at peace and a world of beauty more highly than those with a right-wing orientation and to value national security less highly.

In order to explain the absence of support for a freedom dimension, attention focused on the linguistic ambiguity of Rokeach's item, freedom (independence, free choice) (Braithwaite, 1982; Cochrane et al., 1979; Mueller, 1974a,b). Cochrane et al. referred to the word "freedom" as more of a symbol than a value, with deeply different interpretations in different ideological contexts. A number of questions were raised: Does freedom give individuals the right to encroach on the liberty of other citizens? Is it a license for inappropriate behavior, or is it a more modest statement about human rights? Exacerbating the problem of multiple interpretations was reliance on a single-item measure rather than a multi-item scale (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Gorsuch & McFarland, 1972), an issue that becomes particularly salient given that the test-retest reliability of freedom is relatively low (.63 in Rankin & Grube, 1980; .61 in Rokeach, 1973; .60 in Feather, 1975). Following this line of argument, the problem could be one of measurement rather than of the freedom-equality conceptualization being unsustainable.

Mueller (1974a,b) cast some light on this dilemma through developing new multi-item measures of the concepts of equality and freedom. A 22-item equality scale and a 23-item "democratic" freedom scale correlated modestly with their counterparts in the Value Survey ($r = .39, p < .01$, in the case of equality and $r = .25, p < .05$, in the case of freedom). They also proved to be strongly correlated with each other ($r = .43, p < .01$), however, and were similarly related to liberalism-conservatism. Liberal democrat students scored more highly on both the freedom and equality scales than conservative republicans. This same pattern emerged in the Linder and Bauer (1979) study.

Together these data provide little support for a freedom dimension that is independent of equality yet predictive of differences in political attitudes and

behavior. Indeed, the findings have led Cochrane et al. (1979) and Sidanius (1990) to the conclusion that a two-value model is too simple to explain the variation in political beliefs, a view that appears to have been shared by many as interest in the two-value model faded.

An Alternative Perspective

While these data seriously challenged Rokeach's conceptualization of political ideologies in terms of the value dimensions of freedom and equality, they did not necessarily support Cochrane et al.'s (1979) position that several value dimensions were required to explain the values underpinning political ideologies. Cochrane et al. assumed that the four social values that distinguished political groups represented unrelated aspects of political values. Their thinking was in accord with the dominant paradigm of the time, which was responding to Converse's (1964) claim that mass social and political attitudes lacked coherence and stability. The tide within political ideology research had turned away from generalized and simplified models of belief systems and was seeking explanation in diverse and complex cognitive structures (Feldman, 1988; Inglehart, 1985; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981).

Yet values represent only one component of a person's ideology and there is no reason to assume that values share the complexity of organization found among more specific beliefs and attitudes. A simple value structure does not imply a simple ideological structure. Moreover, the data from structural and correlational analyses of the Value Survey (Bond, 1988; Feather & Peay, 1975; Mahoney & Katz, 1976; Munson & Posner, 1980; Rokeach, 1973) suggest that many values are interconnected, even though the strength of the intercorrelations tends to be low. With inclusion of other political and social values, it was conceivable that an underlying two-dimensional structure could be found to support Rokeach's model.

To test this hypothesis, the domain of political and social values had to be represented more comprehensively than was the case in the Value Survey. Rokeach's five social values had been selected to minimize redundancies. The first task, therefore, was to reverse this process and obtain a representative sample of values from the political and social values domain.

Developing a Representative Value Instrument

A representative sample of values was defined as those values that reflected the aspirations and concerns of the general population. The basic premise was that individuals were the best informants on the values that were important to them and that a strategy that maximized their voice in compiling a list of values was superior to one that relied on a researcher-imposed theoretical schema. The

justification for this approach has been articulated by McKennell (1974) and more recently by Sullivan, Fried, Theiss-Morse, and Dietz (1990, see also Theiss-Morse, Fried, Sullivan, & Dietz, 1991). Sullivan et al. are critical of the practice of operationalizing constructs according to researchers' hunches or theories. Through arbitrarily restricting the domain in this way, they argue, "investigators are not likely to learn much from the subjects of their inquiry, other than whether people generally respond as predicted by researchers' hunches or theories. A richer process of learning and discovery by truly *listening to* respondents' views is precluded" (p. 3).

The research goal, therefore, was to develop a set of value items that reflected the way in which the adult population saw their world rather than the way in which social scientists thought they should see it. Representative sampling of value items was achieved through intensive semistructured interviews with a sample of 73 adults stratified on sex and occupation and randomly selected from the electoral rolls for one division of the city of Brisbane, Australia. The division chosen was heterogeneous in terms of age and socioeconomic status. Since voting is compulsory in Australia, the electoral rolls provided a satisfactory basis for drawing a random sample. Of the 115 names drawn, 88% still resided at the address given on the electoral rolls, and of these, 72% agreed to take part in the study (see Braithwaite, 1979, and Braithwaite & Law, 1985, for further details).

Setting the boundaries of the interview in abstract terms was intimidating and mystifying to people who were not familiar with social science research and who were not all that convinced that studying values was "any use to anyone." On the other hand, setting no boundaries was equally unhelpful because both interviewer and interviewee became lost in the vagueness of the task of deciding what was a value and what was not a value. The favored solution was to depart somewhat from the initial and ideal position of having respondents determine the content of the value domain to one in which respondents made a contribution against a backdrop that was sketched out for them. The backdrop was the Value Survey, which respondents initially completed using ranking and rating procedures. Respondents were then asked to critique the instrument and reconstruct it in a way that reflected their view of the world. Thus, the boundaries of the domain were effectively set through example.

As a consequence of this procedure, Rokeach's 18 terminal values expanded to a list of 36 personal goals and 18 social goals, and the 18 instrumental values expanded to a list of 71 ways of behaving (Braithwaite, 1979, Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). This paper will focus on social values.

Measuring Social Values

The 18 social goals (see Table 1) were measured separately from the personal goals. The rationale was the need to change respondents focus from the world

Table 1. The Scales and Items of the Social Goals Inventory

<i>International harmony and equality</i>	
A good life for others (improving the welfare of all people in need)	
Rule by the people (involvement by all citizens in making decisions that affect their community)	
International cooperation (having all nations working together to help each other)	
Social progress and social reform (readiness to change our way of life for the better)	
A world at peace (being free from war and conflict)	
A world of beauty (having the beauty of nature and the arts: music, literature, art, etc.)	
Human dignity (allowing each individual to be treated as someone of worth)	
Equal opportunity for all (giving everyone an equal chance in life)	
Greater economic equality (lessening the gap between the rich and the poor)	
Preserving the natural environment (preventing the destruction of nature's beauty and resources)	
<i>National strength and order</i>	
National greatness (being a united, strong, independent, and powerful nation)	
National economic development (having greater economic progress and prosperity for the nation)	
The rule of law (punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent)	
National security (protection of your nation from enemies)	
<i>Additional items</i>	
Freedom (being able to live as you choose whilst respecting the freedom of others)	
Reward for individual effort (letting the individual profit from initiative and hard work)	
Domination of nature (controlling nature and making use of the forces of nature)	
Upholding traditional sexual moral standards (opposing sexual permissiveness and pornography)	

of the individual to the world of the group, that is, the nation or society. The instructions for the Social Goals Inventory asked respondents to consider the importance of each goal as a principle that they would use to make judgments about national policies and about world and community events, and at times, to guide their own actions (e.g., when joining certain organizations or voting in elections). Respondents rated each social goal on a 7-point asymmetrical scale (1: *I reject this*; 2: *I am inclined to reject this*; 3: *I neither reject nor accept this*; 4: *I am inclined to accept this*; 5: *I accept this as important*; 6: *I accept this as very important*; 7: *I accept this as of the greatest importance*).

The Social Goals Inventory was among the measures administered to a stratified random sample of 483 adults living in Brisbane, Australia, and to two university samples comprising 208 and 480 introductory psychology students from the University of Queensland, Brisbane, in the middle to late 1970s.

Based on the sample of 208 university students, the test-retest reliabilities for the social values over a four-week period ranged from .46 to .92 (median = .62; Braithwaite, 1982). Of the 18 values, 14 had significant and stable loadings on two dimensions that consistently emerged across two student samples and one general population sample and across different factor analytic models (Braithwaite, 1982; Braithwaite & Law, 1985). The factors were called *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*.

When the social values were analyzed separately, these two dimensions dominated the solutions, accounting for around 80% of the factored variance.

Other factors extracted were defined by specific items (Braithwaite, 1982). When the social values were analyzed with the personal values (Braithwaite & Law, 1985), they dominated the analyses once again, coming together to define the same two major factors and remaining quite distinct from those reflecting personal values. *International harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* were robust across orthogonal and oblique rotations, suggesting that the two dimensions were independent of each other.

The Social Value Scales: Internal Consistency and Intercorrelation

Scales of *international harmony* and *national strength and order* were constructed by summing responses on the items with significant and stable loadings across factor models and samples (see Table 1 for scale items). Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were calculated between scores on *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. The correlations were .38 ($n = 465$, $p < .001$) in the random population sample, and .23 ($n = 462$, $p < .001$) and .12 ($n = 208$, $p < .05$) in the student samples. The alpha reliability coefficients for *international harmony and equality* across the three samples were .83, .86, and .86 respectively. The alpha reliability coefficients for *national strength and order* across the three samples were .83, .82 and .78 respectively.

In a 1988–1989 study of 197 students at the Australian National University (Braithwaite, 1994a), *international harmony and equality* had an alpha reliability coefficient of .85, *national strength and order* had an alpha reliability coefficient of .78, and the two dimensions were orthogonal ($r = .05$). Heaven (1991) found that the two scales correlated .24 in a 1991 community sample of 256 Australian adults, with alpha reliability coefficients of .83 and .79 respectively (personal communication, February 1993).

These data lend support to Rokeach's notion of a two-dimensional value model underlying the political ideology domain. Three departures from Rokeach's model are of note. Instead of single-value items, the dimensions are defined by clusters of items defining value orientations. Second, while *international harmony and equality* captures Rokeach's notion of equality, *national strength and order* is a different concept from freedom. Indeed, one might argue that it is the socially desirable manifestation of the curtailment of freedom. Third, the correlations between the two value scales range from .05 to .38 (mean = .20), with higher correlations occurring in community samples. Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the scales are relatively independent as Rokeach proposed in his model. Of some surprise is the finding that when these scales do correlate, they do so positively, not negatively. The positive, significant correlations between *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and*

order challenge traditional assumptions that values of the left and values of the right are incompatible.

Response Bias

One possible explanation for the positive relationship between the two value scales is response bias since both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* are affected by such problems to some degree. In the scale development study involving 480 students (see Braithwaite & Law, 1985), *national strength and order* was found to be positively related to Couch and Keniston's (1960) Agreement Response Scale ($r = .30, n = 463, p < .001$). *National strength and order* is characterized by the same commitment to order and hierarchy that is part of authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel, Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), a personality dimension that has an established link with response acquiescence (Couch & Keniston, 1960; Peabody, 1966). *International harmony and equality* had a significant but very small association with Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) social desirability scale ($r = .09, n = 463, p < .05$). In an early study of the Value Survey, Kelly, Silverman, and Cochrane (1972) reported that social values were particularly susceptible to response biases of a socially desirable kind.

The most important question associated with response bias is whether the relationship between the value orientation scales would be negative if response biases were controlled. When the effects of social desirability and acquiescence were taken into account through a second-order partial correlation, the relationship between *national strength and order* and *international harmony and equality* remained unaffected ($r = .21, n = 458, p < .001$). Response bias does not appear to account for the two-dimensional structure, leaving intact the central thesis that two relatively independent dimensions underlie social values.

Demographic Correlates and Further Validation

A review of the demographic correlates of *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* identifies only one stable relationship. Older respondents place higher value on *national strength and order* than younger respondents. In Braithwaite and Law's (1985) random sample, the correlation was .19 ($p < .001$). In Heaven's (1991) community sample, the correlation was .20 ($p < .001$; personal communication, February 1993).

A comparison of mean scores on the scales across time shows a pattern of change consistent with findings reported with the Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). In the mid-1970s, political activism on university campuses was high, with major cleavages occurring in the community over the Vietnam War, civil rights, and environmental issues. At this time, students

were less concerned about *national strength and order* than was the general population [$M = 19.07$, $SD = 4.48$ compared with $M = 22.38$, $SD = 4.22$, $t(961) = 11.80$, $p < .001$]. However, they were not significantly more concerned about *international harmony and equality* [$M = 57.04$, $SD = 7.58$ compared with $M = 56.19$, $SD = 7.64$, $t(961) = -1.73$, ns]. By the late 1980s, students were less concerned about both value orientations [$M = 54.99$, $SD = 7.95$ for *international harmony and equality*, $t(675) = 3.15$, $p < .01$ and $M = 17.48$, $SD = 4.45$ for *national strength and order*, $t(675) = 4.20$, $p < .001$], as was the community [$M = 54.21$, $SD = 7.44$ for *international harmony and equality*, $t(739) = 3.38$, $p < .001$ and $M = 20.52$, $SD = 4.88$ for *national strength and order*, $t(739) = 5.39$, $p < .001$].

The scale development sample of 480 university students completed a set of value instruments that could be used to validate *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. Included in a battery of tests, administered over four sessions spanning a month, were measures of Scott's (1960) foreign policy goals of competitiveness and cooperation, Morris' (1956) Ways to Live, and a rating form of the Rokeach Value Survey. Further validation took place in the 1988–1989 student study in which the ranked form of the Value Survey was used.

Table 2. Correlations of *International Harmony and Equality* and *National Strength and Order* with Scott's Foreign Policy Scales, Morris' Ways, and Rokeach's Social Values ($n = 463$)

Related constructs	International harmony and equality	National strength and order
<i>Scott's foreign policy goals</i>		
Humanitarianism	.36***	-.11**
Pacifism	.27***	-.08*
Coexistence	.21***	.02
Cultural development	.31***	-.04
Nationalism	-.05	.41***
Power	-.06	.53***
<i>Morris' ways</i>		
Mastery and control (Way 6)	-.04	.28***
Tradition and discipline (Way 1)	-.02	.19***
Concern for others (Way 3)	.22***	-.06
<i>Rokeach's social values</i>		
A world at peace	.50***	.13**
A world of beauty	.53***	.12**
Equality	.61***	.07
Freedom	.45***	.17***
National security	.14***	.61***

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Table 3. Median Ranks for Rokeach's Five Social Values Differentiating High and Low Scorers on *International Harmony and Equality* and *National Strength and Order*

Values	International harmony and equality			National strength and order		
	Low scorers	High scorers	p^*	Low scorers	High scorers	p^*
A world at peace	12	7	.001	9	10	ns
A world of beauty	13	11	.01	11	12.5	ns
Freedom	8	7	ns ^a	6	8	ns
Equality	13	7.5	.001	10	11	ns
National security	17	16	ns	17	15	.001

*The Mann-Whitney U test was used to test for statistical significance.

^ans: Not significant at the .05 level or less.

Scott's measures of humanitarianism, pacifism, coexistence, and cultural development were expected to overlap with *international harmony and equality*, and his measures of nationalism and power with *national strength and order*. The Pearson product moment correlation coefficients in Table 2 support these predictions.

Morris' (1956) 13 Ways to Live instrument comprises complex paragraphs describing lifestyles or philosophies of life that have relevance across particular cultures and societies. Because each lifestyle incorporates a conglomerate of beliefs, a direct correspondence was not expected between Ways to Live and the two value orientations under investigation. Nevertheless, the highest correlations between the two instruments were consistent with the manner in which the value orientations have been interpreted. From Table 2, *national strength and order* correlated most highly with Way 6, concerned with mastering threatening forces and controlling the world through practical intervention, and Way 1, reflecting the preservation of the best, order, and discipline. In contrast, *international harmony and equality* was most highly related to Way 3, the central theme of which is sympathetic concern for other persons. These findings support a model that presents *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* as two distinct value orientations.

Links were also anticipated between the Social Goals Inventory and the Rokeach Value Survey. A world at peace, a world of beauty, equality, and freedom were hypothesized as the Rokeach counterparts of *international harmony and equality*, while national security was the predicted counterpart of *national strength and order*. Using the rating form of the Value Survey, Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were calculated between the value orientation scales and Rokeach's social goal items. The coefficients in Table 2 again confirm the hypothesized relationships.

In the 1988-1989 student study, Rokeach's ranked social goals were related to the two value orientations of *international harmony and equality* and *national*

strength and order. Respondents were grouped as high or low scorers on each of the value orientation scales, and the median ranks for Rokeach's social values were compared across groups using the Mann-Whitney U test. The findings confirmed previous conclusions, that those who had a high score on *international harmony and equality* assigned greater importance to a world at peace, a world of beauty, and equality in the Value Survey. Freedom was not significantly linked with either value orientation. As predicted, *national strength and order* was related to national security (see Table 3).

Theoretical Support for the Value Model

The emergence of two relatively independent dimensions representing notions of order and equality is not without precedent. Over an extended period, research has appeared supporting a two-dimensional model, but prevailing thought has tended to cling to notions of bipolarity, preferring to interpret one dimension as a left-right political orientation and the other as a personality dimension (see Wilson, 1973). The classic study of this kind is that of Eysenck (1954), who proposed two orthogonal dimensions underlying social attitudes, "liberalism-conservatism" and "tough-tender-mindedness."

A study that Rokeach (1973) saw as being more compatible with his own was that of Kerlinger (1967, 1984). Like Rokeach, Kerlinger attacked the pervasive assumption of bipolarity in political beliefs, explaining his finding of two orthogonal dimensions of "liberalism" and "conservatism" in terms of his theory of criterial referents. Central to Kerlinger's thesis is the notion that the salient referents of conservatives are different in kind from those of liberals or progressives. Conservative referents are private property, religion, tradition, discipline, individual initiative, and patriotism, while progressive referents are social progress, social change, civil rights, racial equality, separation of church and state, and rationality. Conservatives hold strong views about their criterial referents but may vary on how they regard the criterial referents of progressives, and vice versa. Kerlinger argued that bipolarity rather than dualism would exist if a referent was criterial for two groups, positively for one and negatively for the other. This may occur when attitudes of extremists are sought. But, Kerlinger argued, such bipolarity should not be assumed a priori, as is the case when forcing individuals to choose between two options or when reversing items for unidimensional attitude scales.

In the case of values, Kerlinger's (1984) argument gains considerable appeal. Values are, by definition, socially desirable beliefs. As such, they are the positive criterial referents in the culture and cannot be negative criterial referents for the group as a whole. To meet standards of social acceptability, most individuals choose positive criterial referents from society's values and bypass, rather than reject, the values that do not have personal appeal. Where society's values

are rejected openly, allegiance to some politically extreme subculture would be likely. Thus, when the structure of the value domain is under question in the general population, dualism rather than bipolarity provides the more plausible conceptual starting point for research.

As well as having support in the classic social attitude literature, the two-value model is represented in different guises in recent values research. Katz and Haas (1988) have measured two independent dimensions, which they label as "the Protestant ethic," defined by individual achievement, devotion to work, and discipline, and "humanitarianism-egalitarianism," defined by the democratic ideals of equality, social justice, and concern for others' well-being. In a study of the values thought to underlie judgments of fairness in society, Rasinski (1987) failed to find support for his hypothesized four-factor model. Instead, two factors emerged. The first factor was labeled "proportionality," expressing a sentiment toward rewarding individual contribution to society and withholding benefits from those who do not contribute. The second factor, "egalitarianism," represented societal concern about equal access to basic services, equal treatment of all members of society, and the redistribution of wealth.

Support for the Value Model Through Self-Justifications

The data presented so far show that commitment to *national strength and order* can exist alongside commitment to *international harmony and equality*. The basis for identifying these patterns of interrelationships has been statistical. In other words, these data do not indicate whether individuals are conscious of the way in which their values are related, why they are related, or whether commitment to one value is justified through another. Insight into the way in which individuals perceive their values to be related may provide useful data for understanding why the social value domain lacks the bipolarity that is so frequently found in the social attitude domain with the radicalism-conservatism construct.

A value justification study was conducted in which a snowball sample of 40 adults was asked to complete the Goal and Mode Value Inventories and to subsequently build a model of the way in which the values were interconnected (Braithwaite, 1979). Participants were required to identify two types of connections. The link could be *dependent* in that a person justifies belief in one value through a belief in another, or the link could be *associative* in that the values went together without one being more basic than the other. "Going together" was the likely response when values were considered synonymous or when they were inseparable in practice—that is, living by one value meant living by the other.

Participants were presented with the values on individual cards. Values that were associated were grouped together. Values that were dependent on others were connected using matchsticks. Separate models were constructed for the

goals (personal and social together) and for the modes of behaving. In order to ease participants into the task, they were asked to go through the instrument and identify their basic values first. A basic value was defined as one that was valued for its own sake and that could not be justified in terms of any other.

The models built by individuals differed enormously. The measure taken was a count of the number of times any two goal values (or mode values) were linked in an associative relationship or a dependent relationship. The results reported here deal only with connections involving social goals. It is worth noting, however, that it was rare for personal values and social values to be connected in either associative or dependent relationships. Respondents tended to separate the two value systems.

The number of times in which a particular social value was used to justify another value ranged from 1 to 81. Four social values stood out as the most commonly used basis for value justification: (a) international cooperation (53 times), (b) freedom (60 times), (c) human dignity (76 times), and (d) a world at peace (81 times). All were associated with the *international harmony and equality* cluster. Of considerable importance was the fact that the values belonging to the *national strength and order* cluster were much less likely to be justified in terms of each other. They were most commonly justified in terms of a world at peace. The *national strength and order* value that was most frequently used to justify other values was the rule of law (18 times).

In terms of the associative connections between the social values, the most striking finding was that *national strength and order* values were not perceived to be linked to a significant degree. Their associative connections in total ranged from 0 to 13, and were mainly between national greatness and national security, national security and international cooperation, and rule of law and rule by the people. In contrast, the *international harmony and equality* values were the most highly linked on the associative criteria. Most frequently connected values were freedom (24 times), a good life for others (38 times), rule by the people (35 times), international cooperation (26 times), and social progress or social reform (24 times). Their connections were more likely to be with each other than with values from *national strength and order*.

The low perceived interconnectedness of the *national strength and order* values together with their infrequent use as basic values suggests that they may be held in high regard by the sample because of their strategic importance. The *national strength and order* values may be honored, not because they are desirable in their own right, but because they are necessary to achieve the more basic and agreed upon goals of world peace, freedom, and human dignity. This explanation is in keeping with the model of nuclear war policies proposed by Kimmel (1985). He identifies "peace through strength" as one approach and "peace through cooperation" as the other.

The cognitive maps drawn by this sample of respondents contribute to an

understanding of why the *national strength and order* value orientation and the *international harmony and equality* value orientation are often positively correlated in traditional statistical analyses. *National strength and order* may be rejected by some, but for many it is a means to achieving the more popular end states incorporated in the value orientation, *international harmony and equality*.

The Relationship Between Social and Personal Values

Although *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* are empirically and conceptually distinguishable from personal values, the social value scales have been found to correlate consistently with the personal value scales developed from the Goal and Mode Values Inventories (Braithwaite, 1979; Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Braithwaite & Scott, 1991).

International harmony and equality was related to personal growth and inner harmony, a scale that represented goals such as wisdom, self-respect, self-knowledge, self-improvement, the pursuit of knowledge, and inner harmony. Also related to the *international harmony and equality* dimension was sympathetic concern for the welfare of others. This scale brought together such items as being tolerant, considerate, understanding, helpful, forgiving, and generous.

Unrelated to this cluster were scales concerned with status within society. Those with high scores on *national strength and order* scored well on social standing, made up of three items: recognition by the community, authority, and economic prosperity. Propriety in dress and manners also formed part of this cluster with its emphasis on being polite, clean, prompt, neat, refined, and reliable. Such a clustering of values was predicted by Feather (1970), who noted patterns of relationships between the Rokeach values tapping traditional authority.

Although the correlations between the personal and social value scales were not always strong, they raised important issues of an interpretative kind. The social value orientations were reminiscent of Fromm's (1949) typology of the humanistic conscience and the authoritarian conscience. According to Fromm, the essence of the humanistic conscience is to strive to fulfill one's human potential, to have faith in the capacities of oneself and others, and thereby to achieve harmony in one's world. The authoritarian conscience, on the other hand, represents the internalized standards of the authorities in one's culture, whatever those standards may be. Its strength is derived both from fear of and admiration for the authority. Individuals find security through aligning themselves with powerful others and participating in the authority's strength. From the point of view of the present research, the most important aspect of Fromm's work was that he conceived of the authoritarian and humanistic consciences, not as mutually exclusive, but as coexisting in every person.

Fromm's (1949) ideas, together with the links observed between personal

and social values, suggested that the two-dimensional value model could have relevance beyond the domain of political ideology. The picture emerging was of a set of values that were other oriented and sharing and a set of values that were self-protective and security conscious. To test these observations more thoroughly, the 1988-1989 student data were used to examine whether personal values would predict social values in a manner consistent with Fromm's juxtaposition of humanistic and authoritarian consciences.

Hierarchical least squares regression analysis was used to test two hypotheses. First, other-oriented humanistic personal values would predict *international harmony and equality*, but security-conscious authoritarian personal values would not. Second, security-conscious authoritarian personal values would predict *national strength and order*, but other-oriented humanistic personal values would not.

Other-oriented humanistic personal values were operationalized as a positive orientation to others, personal growth and inner harmony, and secure and satisfying interpersonal relations. Security-oriented authoritarian personal values

Table 4. Hierarchical Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting *International Harmony and Equality* from Personal Values

Predictors	<i>r</i>	Standardized regression coefficients	
		Model 1	Model 2
Positive orientation to others	.44	.33***	.32***
Personal growth and inner harmony	.32	.18**	.21**
Secure and satisfying interpersonal relations	.29	.08	.15*
Religiosity ^a	.19		.01
Propriety and effectiveness ^b	.17		-.05
Social standing and achievement ^c	-.19		-.25***
Physical well-being	.12		.01
Assertiveness	.07		.05
Social stimulation	.03		-.03
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		.21***	.26***
Change in <i>R</i> ²			.06**

^aThis is a composite of two of the original scales, traditional religiosity and religious commitment. Their intercorrelation was .53, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

^bThis is a composite of two of the original scales, propriety in dress and manners and competence and effectiveness. Their intercorrelation was .52, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

^cThis is a composite of two of the original scales, social standing and getting ahead. Their intercorrelation was .53, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

**p* < .05.

***p* < .01.

****p* < .001.

Table 5. Hierarchical Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting *National Strength and Order* from Personal Values

Predictors	<i>r</i>	Standardized regression coefficients	
		Model 1	Model 2
Propriety and effectiveness ^a	.48	.26***	.40***
Social standing and achievement ^b	.51	.38***	.35***
Physical well-being	.25	.02	.05
Religiosity ^c	.25	.13*	.17**
Secure and satisfying interpersonal relations	.29	.09	.15*
Positive orientation to others	.18		-.10
Personal growth and inner harmony	.03		-.21***
Assertiveness	.26		-.08
Social stimulation	.15		.01
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		.36***	.39***
Change in <i>R</i> ²			.04**

^aThis is a composite of two of the original scales, propriety in dress and manners and competence and effectiveness. Their intercorrelation was .52, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

^bThis is a composite of two of the original scales, social standing and getting ahead. Their intercorrelation was .53, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

^cThis is a composite of two of the original scales, traditional religiosity and religious commitment. Their intercorrelation was .53, presenting problems of multicollinearity in the regression analysis when used separately.

**p* < .05.

***p* < .01.

****p* < .001.

were operationalized as propriety and effectiveness, social standing and achievement, physical well-being, religiosity, and secure and satisfying interpersonal relations. Secure and satisfying interpersonal relations was hypothesized as a predictor of both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* because the scale reflected both concern for the well-being of others as well as concern for oneself. Physical well-being was of marginal relevance to both clusters of values, but was placed among the security conscious group as a goal that was an outward symbol of status and an inward symbol of personal safety.

From Table 4, the other-oriented humanistic personal values accounted for 21% of the variance in *international harmony and equality*, with a positive orientation to others and personal growth and inner harmony making the major contribution. Contrary to expectations, the security-conscious authoritarian values added a significant 6% of variance, with the major contributor being social standing and achievement. High scorers on *international harmony and equality* placed low value on social standing and achievement.

Table 5 presents a similar story for the personal value predictors of *national strength and order*. The security-conscious authoritarian personal values explained 36% of the variance in *national strength and order*, the major predictors being propriety and effectiveness and social standing and achievement. Contrary to the hypothesis, the other-oriented humanistic values accounted for an additional and significant 4% of variance. Personal growth and inner harmony emerged as a significant predictor, with low commitment to this value orientation being associated with strong support for *national strength and order*.

These findings demonstrate that the personal value system (terminal and instrumental) is linked with the social value system in a highly coherent fashion. Furthermore, the nature of these relationships supports Fromm's descriptions of an authoritarian and a humanistic conscience. The results do not support the discreteness of the humanistic and authoritarian consciences; however. Some personal values that were central to one cluster were not independent of the other. Personal growth and inner harmony was a negative predictor of where people stood on *national strength and order*, while social standing and achievement was a negative predictor of where people stood on *international harmony and equality*. Thus, for some people, tension is likely to exist between their authoritarian and humanistic consciences. Those who value personal growth and inner harmony are likely to endorse *international harmony and equality* and have low regard for *national strength and order*. On the other hand, those who value social standing and achievement are likely to pursue *national strength and order* and disregard *international harmony and equality*.

Social Values, Social Attitudes, and Political Behavior

Materialism-Postmaterialism

Inglehart's (1971) concepts of materialism and postmaterialism have been central to discussions of political values over the last decade. Although some of Inglehart's values are more akin to attitudes within Rokeach's conceptual framework, parallels can be drawn between materialism and *national strength and order* and postmaterialism and *international harmony and equality*. Inglehart pitted materialist values against postmaterialist values, conceptualizing these types as opposite poles of one dimension. Materialist values are the concern of those who have experienced economic or physical insecurity: They give priority to order and stability, and to economic and military strength. In contrast, postmaterialists have been exposed to greater security and are likely to place a higher value on ideas, brotherhood, greater citizen involvement in decision making at government and community levels, and environmental protection.

The 1988-1989 student data provided an opportunity to examine the relation-

ships between the social value orientations of *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* and Inglehart's (1971) typology of materialists and postmaterialists. Inglehart's (1971) four-item measure of materialism-postmaterialism comprises two materialist goals (maintaining order in the nation; fighting rising prices) and two postmaterialist goals (giving the people more say in important government decisions; protecting freedom of speech). Respondents are required to choose the two goals from the list of four that they consider to be the most important. Depending on their choice, they are classified as pure materialist, pure postmaterialist, or mixed. Using an ordered probit model, *national strength and order* and *international harmony and equality* have been shown to make significant and independent contributions to predicting membership in Inglehart's groups (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Pittelkow, 1994). It appears that Inglehart is measuring a construct that reflects tension between the ideals of security and order on the one hand and sharing and caring on the other.

Radicalism-Conservatism

Using the Rokeach Value Survey and Wilson and Patterson's (1968) Conservatism Scale, Feather (1979) identified a set of values relating positively to conservatism, including national security, and a set of values relating negatively to conservatism, including equality and a world of beauty. These findings led to the prediction that conservatives would endorse the *national strength and order* value orientation but would be less favorably disposed to *international harmony and equality*. Furthermore, if the two value orientations are independent of each other, they should add to the predictive power of each other and not detract from each other (Braithwaite, 1994a).

The independent contribution of each value orientation to explaining conservatism was demonstrated through hierarchical least squares regression analyses using the scale development sample of 480 students. *National strength and order* was added to the regression equation predicting conservatism after *international harmony and equality* and vice versa. When *international harmony and equality* was added to the equation after *national strength and order*, the adjusted R^2 changed from 4% [$F(1, 460) = 22.17, p < .001$] to 17% [$F(2, 459) = 49.20, p < .001$], a significant change of 13% [$F(1, 459) = 72.76, p < .001$]. When the value orientation scales were entered into the regression equation in the opposite order, the addition of *national strength and order* after *international harmony and equality* brought a significant change in the adjusted R^2 of 8% [$F(1, 459) = 47.14, p < .001$]. In the regression equation predicting conservatism, *international harmony and equality* had a standardized regression coefficient of $-.30$ ($p < .001$) and *national strength and order* had a standardized regression coefficient of $.37$ ($p < .001$). Thus, as predicted, the two value orientations each

contributed to explaining conservatism net of the other: One was not made redundant by the inclusion of the other.

These findings have been interpreted in terms of the value balance hypothesis: The position that an individual occupies on a radicalism-conservatism dimension can be predicted from the tension that exists between that person's commitment to *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* (Braithwaite, 1994a). Thus, one's radicalism or conservatism does not involve the rejection of some socially desirable values and the adoption of others, but rather the relative preferences assigned to two nonmutually exclusive value orientations. Those occupying extreme positions on radicalism-conservatism will adopt the traditionally accepted view of supporting one set of values and denying the importance of others. Those who occupy the middle ground on radicalism-conservatism, however, have value orientations that balance each other, without necessarily being weak. Such people will endorse both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*, and their movement up or down the conservatism dimension can be brought about through changes in the importance of either value cluster, without necessary changes in the importance of the other. Thus, in times of high unemployment and economic recession, people may become more conservative because they are sensitive to arguments about the need to "tighten the belt," to control crime, to cling to tradition, and to strengthen the nation. They have received the message that the nation is in trouble and that values relating to self-protection, that is *national strength and order*, must be given priority. This is not to say, however, that the community values harmony and cooperation any less.

Election Issues

A further test of the importance of both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* in predicting social attitudes was undertaken using issues that were salient in the 1987 federal election (Braithwaite, 1994a). Political parties of the left and right disagreed on policies relating to income redistribution, crime control, uranium mining, special benefits for aborigines, and women's job opportunities. The attitudes of the 1988-1989 student sample on these issues were highly coherent forming a left-right political attitude scale ($\alpha = .74$). When the social value orientations were used to predict attitude scores that ranged from conservative through to progressive, 41% of the variance in the criterion was explained, with *international harmony and equality* having a standardized regression coefficient of .47 ($p < .001$), and *national strength and order* a coefficient of $-.48$ ($p < .001$). High scorers on *international harmony and equality* were more likely to favor income redistribution, job opportunities for women, and special benefits for aborigines, and oppose uranium mining and deterrence strategies for crime control. High scorers on *national strength and*

order opposed income redistribution, job opportunities for women, and special benefits for aborigines, and supported uranium mining and tough measures for crime control. These findings were consistent with those obtained using the psychological conservatism measure of Wilson and Patterson (1968).

Of particular interest in relation to the political issues was the way in which groups with different degrees of balance in their value orientations responded to particular social issues. The students in the 1988–1989 study were divided into four groups: (a) dualists who scored above the median on both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*, (b) moral relativists who scored below the median on both *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*, (c) the security conscious who scored below the median on *international harmony and equality* but above the median on *national strength and order*, and (d) humanists who scored above the median on *international harmony and equality* but below the median on *national strength and order* (see Braithwaite, 1994a).

Humanists consistently adopted progressive positions on the five election issues. The security conscious favored conservative positions. What was particularly interesting was that both the moral relativists and dualists, while “middle of the roaders” on the social attitude scale, adopted positions on all issues, sometimes agreeing with the right, sometimes the left. They were no more likely than any other group to express ambivalence about any of the issues. As a group, those with balanced value orientations seemed to be conforming to Boulding's (1962) notion of social justice: that a social minimum of compassion and care is important, but that above that level, individuals should be required to play by the rules and earn their rewards.

In general, moral relativists and dualists responded similarly to the election issues, although there was one marked exception. Dualists believed stiffer penalties for law breakers should be introduced. Moral relativists opposed such a shift in policy. Further work is needed to clarify the distinction between moral relativists and dualists.

Willingness to Engage in Political Protest

Students in the 1988–1989 study completed a political activism scale ($\alpha = .74$, $M = 12.72$, $SD = 2.13$) in which they indicated their likelihood of engaging in seven forms of political protest: (a) signing a petition; (b) joining in boycotts; (c) attending lawful demonstrations; (d) joining unofficial strikes; (e) occupying buildings and factories; (f) damaging things, like breaking windows and removing road signs; and (g) using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police. For each item, respondents indicated whether they had done it (scored 3), might do it (scored 2), or would never do it (scored 1).

The question of interest was whether both social value orientations would

contribute to explaining variation in political activism as was the case in the social attitude domain (Braithwaite, 1994b). In an ordinary least squares regression analysis, *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* together explained a relatively small but significant 16% of the variation in willingness to protest. The standardized regression coefficients for the scales were .30 ($p < .001$) and $-.32$ ($p < .001$), respectively. Those who were inclined toward political activity were more likely to believe in *international harmony and equality* and less likely to believe in *national strength and order* as desirable goals for their society. When the social value orientations were entered into the regression equation in a hierarchical fashion, each contributed significantly to explaining activism, net of the other. When *international harmony and equality* was added after *national strength and order*, the adjusted R^2 changed from 8% [$F(1, 189) = 18.87, p < .001$] to 17% [$F(2, 188) = 20.90, p < .001$], a significant change of 9% [$F(1, 188) = 20.94, p < .001$]. When *national strength and order* was added after *international harmony and equality*, the change in the adjusted R^2 was a significant 10% [$F(1, 188) = 23.43, p < .001$].

Voting Behavior

Heaven (1991) used *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* to distinguish left- and right-wing party supporters in a community sample of 256 adult Australians. Both measures contributed to the discriminant function separating four political groups, with those expressing left-wing preferences scoring more highly on *international harmony and equality* and those with right-wing preferences scoring more highly on *national strength and order*.

Using the 1988–1989 student sample, the value orientation scales were related to actual voting behavior in the 1987 federal elections. Voters (those over 18 years of age) could align themselves with one of three established parties, the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal-National Party Coalition, or the Australian Democrats. The first two parties are the traditional left- and right-wing parties, respectively, in Australian politics. The Democrats are a smaller and newer party that identifies itself with small "I" liberals, with environmentalists, and with disillusioned Labor Party supporters who believe their government has lost touch with its constituency. On the basis of Heaven's (1991) findings, the Democrat supporters were combined with the Labor supporters for this analysis.

Of the 197 students who participated in the 1988–1989 study, 159 voted in the House of Representatives election and 156 voted in the Senate election. Using discriminant analysis, one significant function emerged [$\chi^2(2) = 24.27, p < .001$] in which both value orientations contributed to differentiating left and right voters for the House of Representatives election. The standardized discriminant function coefficients were $-.77$ for *national strength and order* and $.81$ for

international harmony and equality. In the Senate, the mean of the discriminant scores again differed significantly for left and right voters [$\chi^2(2) = 22.20, p < .001$], with *national strength and order* having a standardized discriminant function coefficient of $-.73$ and *international harmony and equality* a standardized discriminant function coefficient of $.81$. Those who voted for the Liberal-National coalition in either the House of Representatives or the Senate were significantly more likely than Labor or Democrat voters to value *national strength and order* and significantly less likely to value *international harmony and equality*. The misclassification rates for the House of Representatives and the Senate discriminant functions were large (33% and 35%, respectively), indicating that there are other important factors that need to be taken into consideration to accurately predict voting patterns. This is consistent with recent work that emphasizes the "individualization of politics" and the degree to which "contemporary publics are more likely to base their electoral decisions on policy preferences, performance judgments, or candidate images" (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993, pp. 20-21).

The three political measures—the social attitude scale, the willingness to protest scale, and voting behavior—were all linked to *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* in the same way. Furthermore, social attitudes, willingness to protest, and voting were interrelated with correlation coefficients ranging from $|.25|$ to $|.46|$. Thus, the picture that emerges is of a two-dimensional left-right value representation being transformed into a one-dimensional left-right attitude/behavior representation.

Conclusion

The major goal of this paper has been to establish the robustness of the two-value model and to validate the social value orientations of *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. Robustness was inferred from the stability of the two-dimensional structure across samples and across methods of analysis. Validity has accrued through demonstrating links between the value orientation scales and Morris' (1956) Ways to Live, Scott's (1960) foreign policy goals, Rokeach's (1968, 1973) Value Survey, Braithwaite and Law's (1985) personal value scales, Inglehart's (1977) materialism-postmaterialism construct, and Wilson and Patterson's (1968) Conservatism Scale. Theoretically, the two-value model sits comfortably alongside other two-dimensional models in the fields of social attitudes and personality, specifically Kerlinger's (1967, 1984) criterial referent theory and Fromm's (1949) theory of the authoritarian and humanistic consciences.

In spite of both theoretical and empirical support for the two-value model, an intellectually tantalizing question remains: How can it be that a significant proportion of people hold both "left" values, captured by *international harmony*

and equality, and "right" values, captured by *national strength and order*, simultaneously. The near independence of the two dimensions across five samples means that level of commitment to one value orientation does not place restrictions on one's commitment to the other. The justification study provided an explanation for the compatibility of the two dimensions that many would have expected to be polar opposites. Social values tended to be based on the same highly valued goal, a world at peace. Some saw this goal as being achieved through *international harmony and equality*, some through *national strength and order*, and some through both value orientations. For the several samples of respondents who have completed the Social Goals Inventory, there is no apparent inconsistency in simultaneously holding *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order* as desirable values for society to pursue.

So why do these two independent value orientations map onto a single left-right political dimension comprising social attitudes, voting behavior, and political activism? The explanation offered distinguishes between the way in which individuals think about their world and the way dominant political institutions allow them to express their ideas in the world of action.

The central explanatory principle is that social value trade-offs are not imposed by the psychology of the individual, but rather at the level of social institutions. Political institutions have traditionally presented choices between political parties that are running on a left or right platform and the media has played its part in reinforcing this simple method of identifying candidates and issues. Thus, individuals may simultaneously believe in national economic development and preserving the natural environment, but political decisions are often couched for the public in terms of developing and polluting or stagnating and conserving. The two-value model demonstrates the psychological readiness of individuals for more balanced public debate on policy issues.

Having proposed an hiatus between individual psychology and institutional dialogue, some qualifications and elaborations are warranted. First, in disputing the common premise that values are hierarchically organized for individuals and are guidelines for trade-offs, I am not denying that conflicts between self-protective goals and sharing goals do occur. Within the political arena, it may not be possible to lower taxes and increase welfare. In families, it may not be possible to care for a sick child and provide other family members with their fair share of attention. At the level of behavior, trade-offs are made. To assume that they always do have to be made, however, limits one's capacity for creative insights: Sometimes action plans can be devised that are both self-protective and sharing in their outcomes.

One recent example of the benefits of discarding the trade-off mentality comes from the Harvard Negotiation Project. Fisher and Ury (1981) have argued that negotiation can be conducted more effectively if the parties involved focus on their interests and avoid taking positions. The key move in Fisher and Ury's

methodology of conflict resolution is to persuade conflicting parties to step back from their positions on what they want so that they can get to the more basic level of examining their underlying interests. It is through identifying their basic interests that they can entertain multiple options for solving the problem and arrive at a creative win-win solution. Within the context of this paper, values can be equated with interests while attitudes, preferred policies, or behavioral choices represent positions. To conceive of values as hierarchies of preferences is to move to the level of positions and bypass the level of interests, thereby hampering human adaptability.

Just as individuals sometimes must make trade-offs, political institutions sometimes embrace self-protective and sharing values simultaneously. While the left-right distinction continues to dominate contemporary political thought, it is useful to conceive of Western democratic societies in terms of consensus politics that break away from left-right dichotomies. In the 1992 United States election, Clinton did not challenge Bush's view on the need to be self-protective. For the most part he supported it, but he also took on board humanistic rhetoric about building bridges between the rich and the poor, and between different ethnic groups. Clinton offered power to disempowered groups and emphasized the importance of bringing diverse groups together to work cooperatively to achieve a better society. Bush, on the other hand, stayed true to the values that had won him the previous election. He emphasized the importance of restoring economic well-being and providing a secure future through traditional institutions like the family, the church, unregulated business, and strong law enforcement agencies. In rejecting Bush, Americans were not denying values of self-protection: they were convinced Clinton could achieve these objectives through activating another set of values. The two-value model is compatible with consensus politics in a way that the left-right attitudinal dimension is not. Consensus politics is not necessarily about lack of political commitment, but rather two-dimensional commitment.

Finally, the findings presented in this paper have relevance for the debate on the complexity of populist political views (Converse, 1964). Contrary to mainstream opinion, "middle of the road" attitudes were not the sole prerogative of those who were uninterested in the kind of society in which they lived. "Middle of the road" attitudes were also expressed by those who cared a great deal, but who held balanced value positions. The work of Tetlock (1986) and his colleagues on pluralistic ideologies suggests that the way in which decisions are made by those with balanced value orientations is likely to be cognitively complex, with levels of complexity increasing as commitment to the values increases. Tetlock's thesis would suggest that greater differences should have been found between moral relativists and dualists in this study. Further work needs to be done to address this issue.

For the value-balanced group, other variables may enter into the decision-

making process to relieve value deadlock. The social context and beliefs that certain policies will advance or hinder the attainment of desirable social goals (Feather, 1992) are factors that may be particularly important in the decision-making process when equally important values are at stake. In future research, Lind's (1992) fairness heuristic and Boulding's (1962) notion of the social minimum also may be useful concepts for understanding the way in which those with balanced value orientations arrive at their political judgments.

In the meantime, this paper has a different focus, one that is social rather than cognitive. It questions where the lack of political sophistication noted by Converse (1964) actually lies. Does it lie with individuals who fervently hold to two value orientations deemed incompatible by their social institutions, or does it lie with social institutions that funnel social choices into a trade-off framework of left-right ideology?

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